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tions" shaped by the social circumstances (social structure) and culture of a
particular society, group, or community (Solomon 1984; cf. Gordon 1981,
p. 563; Averill 1980; Harre 1986, 1991; Lupton 1998, pp. 15-17). Among the
many outcomes of this approach is a viewof human emotions as possessing"socially emergent properties"
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",

, ,

we say there are five senses, Yet we know there arc more,

(Diane

Ackerman,

A Natural

Hiswry

, ,"

of the Senses)

"Society, then, provides extensive, incess:mtly renewed, often contm.
dictory lessons, , , it feeds and thwarts, in a word, it educates, the
senses," (Peter Gay, Education of the Senses)

1. Preliminaries
These extended considerations on the emotions of modem selves follow a line
of inquiry that is sociological, specifically, how people's emotional experiences
take their collective shape from the social (institutional) and cultural (symbolic
and expressive) features of societies. This sociological approach develops and
applies to the realm of human emotionality certain theoretical propositions
from the sociology of knowledge whose starting point is collective - particular
societies with their specific institutions, representations, and cultures.2 My interest here is in the collective features of modem societiesinsofar as these bear

on the study of the emotions: how modem notions of personhood - its stan.
dards of human feeling and being, as well as the ideas and social categories that
modern persons use to define and to interpret their experiences - can be under.
stood as particular constructs or features of a cultureof modernity.Both of these
phenomena - the social structure of modem societies and its culture of selfhood or identity - are used to describe the distinct experiences of emotion and
affect of modem individuals.}
From the standpoint of the sociologyof knowledge, the psychological fea-

- properties

that "transcend psychological or phys-

iologicalexplanation" (Gordon 1981,p. 562; 1989).These emergent properties
are explicable only in relation to other social phenomena: emotions combine
features of body, gesture, and cultural meaning. Today this approach to emotion studies is representative of a number of different "social constructionist"
works (Harre 1991; Lupton 1998; Williams 2001, pp. 45-50).
Constructionism's most prominent feature is an emphasis (one that varies
considerably from study to study) on the cognitive and cultural features of emotion. This emphasis it shares with many cognitive psychologists working in
emotions and with those identified with the socialconstructionist movement in
psychology (Gergen 1985; Gergen and Davis 1985; Averill 1980, 1982, 1986;
Harre 1986), as well as with a number of works in cultural anthropology (e. g.,
Lutz 1988; Shweder and LeVine 1984) and philosophy (de Sousa 1987; Rorty
1980; Solomon 1984). Studied this way, emotions are construed as acts or as
symbolic actions or "cultural performances" (Averill 1986, p. 100), involving
both cognitive and physical processes. These formulations are intentionally
employed to provide alternatives to those viewsof emotions as principally bodily, experiential or irrational phenomena. Among the many important features
of this approach to emotions is a historical viewof human emotionality with its
emphasis on changes in the social and cultural environments in which the emotions are experienced and known as well as an interest in the range and variations of human experience (Reddy2001; Lewisand Steams 1998): the historical forms of personhood, the relations of human beingswith the body, the relationship of various discourses (religious,medical, scientific, legal) and cultural
practices to bodily functions, the forms of physical pain and pleasure and their
changing social meanings. One principal outcome of these studies has been an

emerginghistory of emotionsor, more accuratelystated, the discoverythat

structed, meaning that the psychologicalsphere is permeated by social and cultural processes, including the entire cognitive and ideational realm of ideas, beliefs. social symbols, and language. Using this approach, the emotions can be
studied collectively, that is, as ways of acting and being, as "cultural acquisi-

"emotions have a kind of history" (Reddy 2001, p. x), as scholars from medievalists to modernists have come upon various revolutions in the domain of
feelingsand judgments about feelings,their cultivation, control, or expression.
Argumentsfora historyofemotionsfollowlogicallyupona socioculturalapproach to the emotions. Forif the emotions are preeminently cultural phenomena, the principal contexts for their study are the cultural systemsand social
worlds where they are experienced and known, the particular political and religious systems, the various discourses, the collective practices, and the forms of
selfhood that prevail among particular groups and societies.Put differently, it is
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in and through (historically particular) cultural systems that emotions have
come into being as something, that is, as objects of experiences that mean something, and as a differentiated system of signs with which the self engages. A history of emotions is particularly suited to address the question of how precisely
and in what ways, cultures of sentiment and emotion standards, ideas, precepts
concerning how to feel and what to feel and what feelings mean and emotional
experiences themselves, actually change.
At the forefront of emotion studies is the idea that emotions change, since
the emotions - and this is also a way of understanding the self - are the products
of collective acts of interpretation. To know how and what to feel, to be conscious of emotional experiences is, to cite Walker Percy (1958), to be "conscious of something being something." Emotions and feelings come into being
as something, that is, as objects of our experiences that mean something and as a
differentiated system of signs with which persons engage. This returns us to the

-

system of culture in which any object

- an

emotion,

-

a person, an event

-

is know

and interpreted as something. The emotions, for example, have a range of his torical meanings closely associated with aspirations concerning self-control, with
religious salvation or redemption, with self-integration or wholeness, with one's
moral goodness or sinfulness, and with the meanings a person gives to her ability to control what she feels and how she feels it. Today, as many have observed,
the emotions have become signifiers of how much and how deeply we feel
things (or fail to feel things). According to many commentators on the emotions today, the social world oflate modernity is distinguished by both an enormous popular and scientific concern given to the emotions. As some have argued, emotional experiences have become the foundation of what it means to
fully be a "self," to apprehend who I am and want to be. Feelings and emotions
have corne to serve as one of the principal experiences of self-validation, as the
moorings, the moral and spiritual resources, from which to claim an identity
and to build a self-conception. "To find out what one feels becomes a search for
oneself' (Sennett 1974, p. 336; d. Bellah et al. 1986, chap. 6; McCarthy 1989a;
Barbalet 1998; Giddens 1991; Lowney 1999).
What follows is an argument for emotion studies that is both cultural- focussed on cultural systems of meaning as the locus of human emotionality - and
historical, arguing that sociocultural changes across time will, in turn, be registered in the domain of human sentiments and experiences, although how precisely culture and experience change relative to each other is a matter to be investigated.

The question

at hand is on the emotions

of modern

persons

-

a dis-

tinct culture of selfhood and an accompanying emotionality, a special relationship to the body and its functions, an identifiable set of standards of emotional
control

32

and expression

-

in fact, many of these topics have already been identi-

bzs 27.Jg.

fied with a history of modernity in its different phases: in the early modern period with its rules and new standards of "civility"and etiquette and an accompanying rise in self-consciousnessabout the artful process of self-presentation
(Elias 2000; Greenblatt 1980); with the 18t!,century rise of "sentimentalism"
(Reddy 2001; Taylor 1989), an emotional regime that, in its full flowering,extolled emotions as both natUral and morally good; with the development of
nineteenth century "sentimentality," expressed in a Victorian reserve in matters of feelings

-

a reserve that struggled with the widely accepted view of the

"vitality of feelings" (Gay 1984, p. 455).
Using the framework I have outlined here, I will locate the emotions as
"senses" of the modern self, arguing that the emotions have taken on specific
meanings within modernity's history, that the emotions have become special
objects of attention and elaboration for modern selves or "subjects." What I
mean by the emotions as sensesof modern selves I mean this figuratively,as I

-

mean to capture what emotions are in the everyday sense of things

- is that

the

-

emotions have taken on some of the historical meanings of the five senses vision, hearing,

touch,

smell, taste

- as vehicles

of knowledge

of the world, as so

many channels transmitting to our minds and consciousness the (external)
realm of reality. Today, the emotions, what and how and how much we feel,
have become paramount features of our encounter with the world, an encounter that, in contrast to the encounter of our senses with the world, is an inward
encounter. Just as the senses were said to link the knowingsubject with the objective world (the "known"), the emotions represent a new direction, a new
movement, and a new location of knowledge for modern subjects - an inwardness, a new interior domain where the emotions are housed. The emotions, we
are told today, emanate from deep within the self, as signifiers of our inner
depths and spaces, "their sublime origin" (Reddy 2001, p. 316). A history of
modern emotions can begin here, with a cultural history, however tentative
and incomplete, with the formation of modern inwardness, the sense that we
are beings with inner depths wherein our truest self resides.

II. The Contours of Modem Selfhood

-

At whatever moment we enter the history of modern selfhood with Freud's
monumental creation of its interior topography,or with nineteenth century accounts of modern bourgeois individualism, or with its beginnings in Renaissance humanism, what Burckhardt (1954) called the development of the free
or "spiritUal individual"

- we discover

in this process something new and dis-

tinctive in the human person, its inwardness.By inwardness, I do not mean
2/2002

33

The Emotions: Senses of the Modern Self

E. Doyle McCarthy

what philosophers call self-consciousness, that universal ability to distinguish
ourselves and our own experiences from others and from our worlds; nor do I
mean the reflexive quality of human thought and speech where, in thinking
and in speaking, one's thought and speech becomes part of a deliberate and
conscious repertoire inserted into our human relations and intercourse. To
claim that only modern persons can be so characterized is to deny to all but a
few what is clearly a mark of us all: we are signifying beings, both reflective and
dialogical.
moral, spiriThe meaning of inwardness I wish to convey is a disposition
tual, and psychological- one that in modern societies has come to be viewed as
a social good. To be a self, according to modern cultural meanings, involves persons in the pursuit and acquisition of self-knowledge, a knowledge not for its
own sake but for the purpose of controlling and for "fashioning" one's selfhood
or identity, for making up oneself, for articulating one's own presence in the
world. "Self-fashioning," as Greenblatt (1980, p. 1) calls it, is not an invention
of modernity; there were selves and "a sense that they could be fashioned" before this era. But what was born in the early modern era of the sixteenth century
was both an "increased self-consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process" and a new-found sense of autonomy: "the
power to impose a shape upon oneself is an aspect of the more general power to

-

control identity

-

that of others at least as often as one's own" (Greenblatt

1980, p. 1; cf. Elias 2000, pp. 85-109).
This inwardness is also a disposition that has attached us, relative to other
peoples and civilizations, to ourselves,an argument made first by Tocqueville
(1990). Durkheim (1984, p. 122) elaborated it later, and more systematically,
in his study of the industrial division of labor:
There is indeed one area in which the common [collective] consciousnesshas grown
stronger. . . in its viewof the individual. As all the other beliefsand practices assume
less and less religiousa character, the individual becomes the object of a sort of religion. We carry on the worship of the dignity of the human person which, like all
strong acts of worship, has already acquired its superstitions.

.. It is indeed

from soci-

ety that it draws all its strength, but it is not to society that it binds us: it is to ourselves.
This disposition has also given to the domain of the "subjective" and "personal"

decidedly emotional social values

- values of sentiment. This is because the

modern self is directed to a field of new objects

- objects

that exist in a new so-

cial space, a world of innerobjectS(Charles Taylor's term), objects whose mean-

-

interiority" might be traced (Dejean 1997, chap. three). Or, with the eigh.
teenth.century theory of the sentiments, a later change when sentiments be.
came "normative" (Taylor 1989, p. 284):
Sentiment is now important. . . because undistorted, normal feeling is my way of access into the design of things, which is the real constitutive good, determining good
and bad. . . . The new place of sentiment completes the revolution which has yielded
a modern view of nature as normative, so utterly different from the ancient view. . .
endorses nature as the source of right impulse or sentiment. . . Nature as norm is an
inner tendency; it is ready to become the voice within, which Rousseau will make it,
and to be transposed by the Romantics into a richer and deeper inwardness.

Taylor elaborates this "massiveshift" in the making of the modern identity and
in its valuation of emotions in two ways:first, by the eighteenth century there is
an entirely new understanding of the "subject" where thought and valuations
are psychic phenomena

- they

are in the mind; "what was previously

-

the psychological- are now confined to minds" (Taylor 1989, p. 186).
Secondly, Taylor elaborated this "massiveshift" in its corresponding notion
of the good

- its love

of nature

and its "cult of sensibility"

-

and traces its devel.

opment in philosophical texts, but also other works that trace in the history of
commercial activity, in marriage and familylife,in religiousmovements and revivals (among Pietists and Methodists), and in the rise of the modern novel,
changes in sentiments, ethical outlooks, and new understandings about nature's vitality and the importance of "inner life"and feelingsas "moral sources"
of the modern person. In this way,Taylor documents movements that both re.
flected and helped to usher in the rise of a modern and individualist culture: it
values personal autonomy; it renders "self.exploration" important, particularly
the understanding ofone's emotions; its "visionsof the good life. . . involve per.
sonal commitment" (Taylor 1989,pp. 285-86). I am highlighting Taylor's care.
ful tracing of the history of the modern self
mental

self

- as a way

to describe

its important

- a self of sentiments
discursive

sources;

and a senti.
this is an in.

tellectual (principally,philosophical) historical study and not a work of "histor.
ical explanation."s Despite this, it is also a project whose arguments about
moral discourse and human understanding assume a distinctive theory of the
self, one that can be used to examine how the emotions today carry such cultural weight and are both sociallyand politically consequential.

- one

ing and significance hardly existed before before when? The seventeenth century, that age of sentimentalism when modern "subjectivity" and its "culture of

of the self in social science today

34
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seen as ex.

isting . . . between knower/agent and world, linking them and making them in.
separable" (Taylor 1989, p. 188), is now seen as belonging to the subject. Taylor
and others have called this shift "a new subjectivism. "4 "Thought and feeling

Taylor's

idea of the self

that is clearly different from dominant theories
is that the self is a being constituted
in the

-

35
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taking of moral positions, of acting relative to "goods," however differently understood in particular historical and cultural circumstances. His question: how
did modem notions of the good develop along with new understandings of human
agency and selfhood? I will return to this question again, for it contains a proposition about the emotions as powerful cultural objects (McCarthy 1989aj 1989b)
whose momentum derives from their interior location as natural forces within,
as inner essences. As many have argued, these inner essences (emotions) have
been with us since the cultural transformations of the seventeenth century and
the movements of eighteenth-century
Enlightenment and Romanticism.6
However, the emotions have clearly taken on different social meanings over
time. Put differently, there is a "vocabulary of the emotions" whose history cona "shared body of words and meanings . . . sigtinues to be traced today

-

nificant, binding words in certain activities and their interpretation" (Dejean
1997, p. xiii, 91; cf. Williams 1983, p. 15). Today's "vocabulary of emotion"
(just as with today's particular formsof "inwardness") still needs to be written.
And while we know something of its sources in early modem history - a history
of emotions traced, however differently, by Taylor's (1989) intellectual history
of modem inwardness and Reddy's (2001) proposal for a history of emotions,
today's "emotions" belong to a vocabulary of more recent origin whose "key
words" (Raymond Williams's phrase) might include: self, identity, freedom,
authenticity, psychology,pleasure, culture, nature. It is to that, more recent,
history and culture that I now turn.

III. Civilizing Processes and Modem Emotionality
SocioLogists of emotion claim a variety of classic works as part of its current perspective and set of research problems.7 Among these works, Norbert Elias's The
Civilizing Process, is singled out for its examination of human emotionality within a framework of social and historical change. The direct relevance of this
work to a discussion of modern "inwardness" and its valuation of emotion and
feeling is to be found in its argument that the social changes associated with
modernity (most especially, greater social differentiation and the increased interdependencies that coincided with the formation of states and the centralization of power) were accompanied by simultaneous changes in the body and its
functions: an increased capacity for self-consciousness and self-monitoring; increased levels of shame, embarrassment, and disgust associated with the body
and its functions. These changes also coincided with the rise in a distinct consciousness of self- an increased sense of "autonomy" and an accompanying separation of the self from the "outside world" (Elias 2000, pp. 472 ff.).

36
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There is a close relationship of each of these changes to Taylor's account of
"inwardness" and modem identity,8 although Elias provides rich and extensive
materials from social and institutional history to advance his social and historical argument about the modem self and its development. In what follows, I will
highlight some of Elias's principal accounts of the historical development of the
"civilized" person in modem European societies and its accompanying notion
of the self-controlled, privatized individual, autonomous and self-conscious arguments that bear most closely to an emotional portrait of modem selfhood.
Elias provides a distinct emotional history by giving us a history of etiquette.
His thesis is that the history of Western society from the late Middle Ages to
the nineteenth century represents a gradual transformation in people's ideas
(and later, their behaviors) concerning manners and bodily propriety, changes
associated with a number of factors, particularly (in its early phases), the importance of court societies with their codes of behavioral and emotional deportment. Central to this transformation were decisive changes in the feelings of
shame, repugnance, and embarrassment that attended a wide range of bodily
functions such as eating, spitting, nose-blowing, urinating, and defecating.
This history of manners can be read as a history of a word and a concept,
"civilization": first, the courtoisie or courtliness of the Middle Ages, next the civilite of the Renaissance through the early sixteenth century, and finally, civilisation of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The words signify moments in the long-term process of social and psychological development. Each
indicates different standards of conduct within a sequence of change. In its fullest development civilization refers to Western nations' consciousness of themselves as bearers of a stage of human and social development, a consciousness of
their own superiority in morality, law, and in their scientific and artistic
achievements. The development of this idea coincided with a long-term trend:
affect and impulsecameunder increasinglytightersocialand personalcontrolsand
shame thresholds advanced accordingly.
Elias sees a transition to a new and different standard of behavior introduced
in De civilitate morum puerilium ("On civility in children") by Erasmus of Rotter-

dam, published in 1530 - a standard represented by civilitewhich acquired its
meaning during the second quarter of the sixteenth century when chivalry and
the unity of the Catholic church were disintegrating. This highly influential
treatise by Erasmus (it had over one hundred and thirty editions and appeared
in many translations) reveals a new sensitivity about how people should conduct themselves in society, extending beyond table manners to bodily propriety

- carriage,

dress, and facial appearance

and gestures.

While many of the earlier

directives from courtesy books are repeated by Erasmus, one detects a new way
of seeing, of distancing oneself from what one sees. There is a greater sensitivity
2/2002
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to how one appears to others. Erasmus's own precepts reveal a careful eye and
he exhorts his readers to be observant. Civility, as Elias notes, is removed from
mere courtesy and closelybound up with a manner of seeing. Look about you,
Erasmus urges, and pay attention to people, their feelings, and their motives.
For Elias, this signifiesa critical moment in the history of the civilizingprocess:
human behaviortakeson a differentcharacterseenin the increasedtendencyto observe oneselfand others. According to this standard, "people moulded themselves and others more deliberately than in the Middle Ages" (Elias 2000,
p. 68). As the demand for self-control was raised, controls became more internal and unconscious (2000, p. 109;pp. 117-19; pp. 365-87). In this way, Elias
speaks of certain affect-expressionsbecoming, in time, "privatized," or "forced
into the 'inside' of individuals, into 'secrecy'..." (Elias 2000, p. 121).
Elias's historical argument - I highlight only those aspects that pertain to
modern

identity

and emotionality

- is fruitfully

read alongside

Taylor's

treatise

on the discursivehistory of modern identity (in philosophy, theology, literature,
etc.). Regardless of the important methodological differences that separate
them, both provide a portrait of modern selfhood as a structure that has, in time,

moved inward. This interior movement - we think of feelingsand thoughts as
"inside" or "within" - has many sources and expressions: increased social controls on instincts and emotions become internalized; the body and its functions
undergo a "civilizing" process that renders this domain private and intimate;
the "civilizing" process coincides, in important ways, with an "increasing split
between an intimate and public sphere, between private and public behavior"
(Elias 2000, p. 160). This divided self is also a self whose interiority is nature
within us (Taylor); our "inside" or our interiority is the place where we discover

havior, standards thrust into social life as sociopolitical interdependencies
changed changes that coincided with modern civilization's development:
"The fortunes of a nation over the centuries become sedimented into the habitus of its individual members" (Elias 1996, p. 19).

-

IV. Emotion Studies: A Discourse on {Post)Modem Selfhood
But what about the emotions and the self today, in this phase of modernity's
history?Recent studies by sociologistsof the emotion address the general question of how and why the emotionsare importantin today'sworld (Barbalet 1998;
Lupton 1998;Williams 2001) and each of these address the "civilizing"thesis of
Elias and its contemporary relevance, a topic I will return to shortly. In addition, there is a growth of sociologicalstudies that address the role of emotions in
multiple forms and contexts of social life: for example, in consumer cultures
and mass media; the rise and growing influence and popularization of "therapeutic culture"; emotions and the problem of social controls
violence

- in advanced

capitalist

societies;

the changing

- rising crime and

standards

of behavior

Modem history tells us how much culture matters in this process. How the modern disposition or habitus is a construct of changes in European standards of be-

and feeling ushered in by globalization; the role of emotions in "identity movements" of races, ethnicities, nations, and sexualities. Studies of contemporary
culture, such as these, share a recognition of the importance of thinking about
emotions in a world where emotions have become more and more manifest.
However much the emotions have been neglected in previous eras, in contemporary social science they have become one of its central concerns: in popular culture such as studies of television "talk shows" (Lowney 1999); in studies
of intense emotions involved in social movements (Goodwin et al. 2001); in
mass media where "entertainment" and "celebrity" rule and transform news
and politics (Gabler 1998); in sports and leisure where emotions are aroused
(Dunning 1999); and in studies of emotions in everyday life (Katz 1999;
Swidler 2001). Emotions are seen as ingredient to our leisure, fun, and massproduced utopias (Illouz 1997). "Capitalist culture" has become, in the last half
century, a powerfulcarrier of a culture of hedonism, pleasure, and release (Bell
1996). These are some of the themes of contemporary emotion studies.
In several important respects, these studies have begun to capture - in a descriptive way - today's particular "structure of feeling" (Williams 1973) and
how it has become a culture distinguished by so many emotionalpursuits(in leisure, sports, relations with other, consumption) and emotion talk. It can even
be said that we live today in a worldof emotions, a world where psychologyhas
become a mass idiom and where feelingsare the topic of endless talk - on radio
and television "talk shows";in the officesof practitioners whom we seek for ad-
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- in sentiment

and feeling - not only who we are, but Nature itself brimming

within us:"The worldabout uswouldbe desolateexceptforthe worldwithin
LIS...y

Elias's argument

-

that increased (social) controls corresponded to an in-

crease in (personal) controls and an accompanying rise in levels of shame and
anxiety

-

is a sociohistorical argument, despite its resonance with Freudian the-

ory (Elias 2000, p. 442):

. . . we realize thedegreeto whichthefearsandanxietiesthatmovepeopleare human-made
. . . the strength, kind and structure of the fears and anxieties that smoulder or flare in
the individual never depend solely on his or her own "natUre" . . . They are alwaysdetermined, finally, by the history and the actual structure of his or her relations to
other people, by the structure of society; and they change with it.

6zs 27.Jg.
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vice about our "emotional lives"; in the exchanges we have with friends and intimates about what we feel, how deeply we feel, and what these feelings mean.
the rise of spectator
In public life, we witness collective displays of emotions
Sports and their mass consumption, rock and rap concerts, the new political
conventions in the U. S., mass meetings of churches and religious assembliesas well as new public monuments and memorials ("shrines to sentiment") and
new museums to mark and to remember assassinations, atrocities, and human
disasters. Despite the vastly different emotional forms and sites of these examples, they share in common certain features of modern identity: we are in im-

-

-

portant ways - constituted by our emotions and feelings. Self-expression, particularly the expression of our emotions, is an expression of our truest and most
inner natures as persons. Emotions and feelings - "getting emotions out" and
"emotional pursuits" are vital aspects of today's cultural practices as well as
each person's "emotional habitus" (Kane 1997; 2001). The narrative history of
modern identity and emotionality
our emotions are powerful inner forces of na-

-

ture and our deepest selves

scape.

- is a narrative

played out on today's cultural

land-

If the discourseofself,as Calhoun (1994b)has written, is a modern discourse
about the social location of modern individuals, then the discourse of emotion
is also a discourse about modern selfhood and identity. Many of the studies to
which I just referred return to the problem of identity: particularly the unfolding and seeminglyunchartered and ungrounded domain of people's identities,
about which so much has been written in the last decade (Appiah and Gates
1995; Aronowitz 1992;Balibarand Wallerstein, 1991;Calhoun 1994a;Gergen
1991; Giddens 1991;Lash and Friedman 1992;Parker et aI., 1992). For feelings
and emotions serve as one of the principal experiences of self-validation, as the
moorings, the moral and spiritual resources fromwhich to claim an identity and
to build a self-conception. Within late modernity

- for reasons discussed

here _

the emotions have become precious vehicles for rendering one's life and one's
identity meaningful.
Anthony Giddens's writings (1991; 2000) on contemporary social movements highlight those particular features of late modernity that are linked to a
new and distinct type of political movement called "identity politics" such as
movements based on ethnicity, race, or'gender and with issuesof the bodysuch
as abortion politics, and movements linked to current ideologies of selfhood,
what Giddens calls "life politics" (1991, p. 214) and the ethos of self-growth.
Life politics, Giddens writes, "concerns political issues which flow from processesofself-actualization
in post-traditionalcontexts,whereglobalizinginfluences intrude deeply into the reflexiveproject of the self,and converselywhere
processes of self-realizationinfluence global strategies." Demonstrations of re40
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cent decades in the U. S. involving abortion rights and pro-life politics and
world-wide political movements of groups (classes,nations, ethnicities, races)
seeking to affirmand to achieve political and personal recognition are some of
the sociocultural sites where political passionsare mobilized,passionswhose intensity require multifaceted inquiries to account for them, inquiries that examine how human identifications are structured and restructured sociallyand politically, moving between intense primarybonds of familyand the "grand identifications"of nation and race (de Swaan 1992; cf. Anderson 1991; Calhoun
1991a).
Giddens (1991, pp. 217-18) contends that in the present social and political
context it is difficult to distinguish "life-political"identity issues and concerns
focussed on the body. For today, neither the body nor one's identity are commonly viewed as natural objects. Today, both are increasinglysubject to discursive practices and reflexive action (self-help texts and techniques, therapies,
exercise machinery and manuals, sex changes, plastic surgery for breasts and
noses, organ transplants). The embodied selfhas become a "site of interaction,"
worked on by the techniques and the practitioners of high modernity. "The
body itself," Giddens

writes, "as mobilized

in praxis

- becomes

more immediate-

lyrelevant to the identity the individual promotes" (1991, p. 218) or an identity
promoted by society. The body is that last domain of privacy and secrecy, that
site of emancipatory acts and politics.
The work of Giddens (1991) extends the argument of Elias (2000) on the
self-reflexive and self-monitoring features of modern identities. Studies by
Wouters (1992; 1998) directly address the issueof emotional self-controls and
emotional self-monitoring as continuing dimensions of identity and emotion
today. He argues that the civilizingprocess and its accompanying controls have
become both more varied and increasingly"subjective" or individualized, that
is, relegated to a person's capacities for reflexive self-monitoring and control,
due, in part, to the growingdifferentiation of societies in late modernity. These
trends have coincided within the increasing "emancipation of emotions" as
part of a long-term

process of "informalization"

- due

to the relaxation

and dif-

ferentiation of behavioral, emotional, and moral standards (Wouters 1992,
p. 229; cf. 1999). An important feature of emancipation and informalization
has been the dissemination of "emotion knowledge" (McCarthy 1989a) or a
heightened consciousness about emotions through education, mass media, and
the role of therapeutic culture in contemporary life.Informalizationis also associated with the growingconviction of many that emotional controls should be
relaxed. Wouters points to a "new level of reflexivecivilization" (1999, p. 424)

- internal

and self-conscious processes of monitoring one's own internal states
and social behaviors as well as those of others - as ingredient to the growth of
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emotional "permissiveness" and "informalization." This argument parallels
Giddens's argument, discussed above, on the increasing reflexivityof contemporary identities: "the reflexivityof modernity extends into the core of the self
. . . the selfbecomesa reflexiveproject"(1991,p.32).

V. Conclusion: Alienation in an Age of Emotion
Recent studies have pointed to an alienation of emotion that coincides with today's consciousness of emotion and feeling. There are many discussions of the
sources of this experience, some of which have entered the social science literature. Barbalet (1998, pp. 171-176) describes a "narrowing of emotional experience, tt arguing that it is associated with subjectivization or the reduction of social
reality to the domain of the self or the reduction of the human capacity for feelings and emotions to self-feelings and emotions, such as self-esteem, self-hatred,
embarrassment, shame, or anxiety. In Barbalet's words (p. 172):
the rise of emotion as a focus of widespreadand popular concern at the present time
operates through a double process: a shrinking of the phenomenal world to the self,
and self-experience as the defining force of what constitutes emotions.
Not only is reality reduced to its apprehension by individuals, but the complex
momentous - events in the world today are construed in highly

- sometimes

personal terms and in the popular idiomof psychology.Among the many effects
of this "shrinking of reality" is the trivialization of human events and human
feelings:the measureof things is not only ourselves,but our feelingsabout
things and ourselves.
Other commentators describe the sources of this alienation as an effect of
rationalization (in Max Weber's meaning of the world) or the "disenchantment of the world" where life-experience is reduced to instrumental reason or
framed within the utilitarian values of our commercial civilization: the traditional matrices which gave meaning to life have been replaced by purely instrumental patterns of action: life has lost its purpose, its depth of meaning;
there is a loss of passion - themes of modern writers from Tocqueville to
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.
This is a difficult and elusive topic to address, particularly from the standpoint of sociology.However, we might do so through the concept of the emotions as a mastersymbol- and in a way that extends our commentary on modern
inwardness and emotion as both historical and social constructs. As a master
symbol, the emotions sum up many emotional themes of contemporary life in
this world of runaway change:

.
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Emotions are real and natural signs of our true selves, keys for unlocking our
per~onal and inner lives; the emotions operate as the touchstone of the modern
self in a fabricated world.
Emotions are signs of our abilities to control our lives and our destinies; and
just as modern selfhood has been conceived as a project of self-fashioning, the
emotions are artful productions of reflective selves.
Real emotionselude us. In our overly-managed world, a world where emotions are "packaged" and consumed along with other products of the market,
what we really seek is to really feel. Despite all our emotion talk and our emotionallabors, we suspect that all along we have not felt or felt deeply at all.
Does our incessant emotion talk and emotional pursuits belie the recognition of our alienation - not only from "emotion" but from passion as well? Is our
intensified emotion consciousness also seen as an expression of our sense of displacement in the realm of our feelings that quality of lost spontaneity both in

-

-

-

our ability to feel and in our ability to identify with what we feel about our feelings (McCarthy 1989a, p. 65)? We not only "have strong feelings about [our)
feelings" (Stearns and Stearns 1986, p. 15), we also have fears and anxieties
about our feelings and about our inability to feel (Sennett 1974, p. 324).
However, these fears may not have been born fromour very own overly managed, manufactured, and monitored world. Writing at the approach of our recent fin de siecle,Joan Dejean (1997,p. 123)describedthat momentousand
firstfin desiecle,at the turn ofthe eighteenthcentury,as an ageverymuchlike
our own in matters of the heart:
. . . desirous of interiority and engaged in the collective creation of an obsession with
affective precision because it was terrified of emotional emptiness. . . individuals not
fully in touch with their hearts and so frozen by affective paralysis that they only realize what they are/were feeling after the fact.

Cultural inquiries such as DeJean's, as well as the many recorded here, push
emotion studies into an area of study as yet unexplored: studies of our emotion
sciences asthemselvescultural formations, inquiries into the waysthat academic
knowledges (including our sciences) are cultural texts that "say" something
about the specific contours of selfhood and affectivity for us today, studies that
address Michel Foucault's question: "What are we today?" "What are we in our
actuality?" (1988, p. 145). His line of inquiry concerned the exact history of our
present

self-attentiveness

-

the technologies

that permit us to affect our bodies,

souls, thoughts, relations, and action and, in such as way, that we achieve
authenticity, happiness, peace, and purity (1988, p. 18).
According

to the cultural logic I have used here

- the

emotions

can be studied

ascollectiverepT/!sentations
of contemporary world (McCarthy 1989a,pp.66-67),
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as preeminent molds for our mental lives, one of the ways the contemporary mind
represents to itself its encounter with the world, in much the same way that
Levi-Strauss (1969) portrayed "totemism," not as a thing in itself, not even as a system or set of practices of primitive peoples involving animals or plants. The theory of totemism signifies something about ourselves, he argued. "T otemism is like
hysteria," the book opens. They both arise "from the same cultural conditions;"
they entail a strategy, one "common to many branches of learning toward the
close of the nineteenth century, to mark off certain human phenomena. . . which
scholars preferred to regard as alien to their own moral universe. . ."
Emotions, I suggest, can be conceptualized and studied in much the same
way as Levi-Strauss portrayed totemism: as "cultural artifacts," as sign-systems
operating in the realm of mass culture (Barthes 1972, p. 9), as powerful and
mystifying things, a feature of this mystification, their capacity to reveal to us
the greatest truths about our selves today (Turner 1976; Benton 1993).
If we think about emotions studies (or our sociologies, psychologies, philosophies) as cultural texts, as Levi-Strauss did of totemism, we might begin to provide readings of these texts and their discordant, conflicting, and incommensurable messages ("findings" and "theories") about what the emotions are and
what a self is. In contrast to sociology's long standing attempt to "nail down"
empirical facts about emotions, a cultural reading might find in these incommensurable findings about the emotions, a peculiar kind of cultural sense. For
"culture" is not neutral, nor does it speak in a single voice. Our science of emotions might be "read" as a kind of register of these unresolved questions about

what a selfis and what our feelingsmean, questions articulating our present preoccupation with what we are: how our actions are our own and not our own. . .
whether or how we are selves or constructed selves, and in what ways. Are we
our own creation or in thrall to forces outside us? Are we natural beings or are
we unbearably unnatural? Are we feeling deeply, or not at all? What do our
feelings and emotions tell us, say to us? Emotions - sensesof (our) selves, eyes
and ears of our (modern) souls.

Notes
1
2

For c.:arlier statements on this paper's themes see McCarthy (1989a; 1994).
The idea that modern individuals have distinct characteristics
as selves is an idea studied
and elaborated

in different

fields of study includinll social psychology,

sOciolollY, history,

and philosophy. Several recent projects in the social sciences that address this topic arc
McCarthy (1994), Williams (2001), Lupton (1998), Lutz (1988), Wouters (1992), and in
history Stearns (1994), Stearns and Lewis (1998), and Reddy (2001). Taylor's (1989)
comprehensive
philosophical study of the modern subject and its interiority also address-
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es the rise of modern "inwardness"
r999; 2001) has been, in important
3

and sentiment.

In psychology,

Ger~en's

work (1991;

ways, related to these themes in the humanities.

The field of the sociology ofknowled~e has typically examined the entire ideational realm
(knowled~es, ideas, mentalities, etc.) and their social locations. More recently it has been
applied to the study of human psychology and to such topics as the social self or identity.
Early statements
include Berger (1970; 1977), Farberman
(1973), and McCarthy
(1989a).

4

Taylor used this phrase (1989, p. 188) as others have also used it to descrihe the modern
identity. For example Berller has used it in his discussion of the "pluralization
of lifeworlds" (1967; cf. Berger et aI., 1973); Gehlen's Man in the Age ofTechnolog:y (1980) uses
"suhjectivization"

explicitly and bears a close relationship

to some of the themes

of this

5

paper.
For a full discussion

6

houn criticizes Taylor for his ne~lect of the sociological factors that bear directly on his
subject. Despite this criticism, Calhoun ar~ues that Taylor's work is an excellent startin~
point for understanding
the self as moral subject.
For a documentation
and critical use of recent writin~s in a modern history of emotions,

of Taylor's

methodolo!,'Y see Crai~ Calhoun's

(1991b)

article. Cal-

see William Reddy's (2001) study whose principal research setting is Revolutionary
France and its sentimentalism
in literature and philosophy. See also his (1997) The Invisible Code: Honor and Sentiment in Postrevolutionary
France, 1815-1848.
7

Included here might be Max Scheler's The Nature of Sympathy (1954) and his Ressentiment
(1961), Georg Simmel's (1950) treatment of the social psychological implications of secrecy and betrayal, and Helen Merrell Lynd's work (1958) on the role of shame and its relationship to guilt. Harold Bershady (1992) has provided for the English reader a valuable
edited collection of Scheler's writings as well as an introduction
to his work.

8

See, in particular,

9

Taylor (1989, p. 493) cites a poem (of which I cite only one line) of Wallace Stevens from
his Opus Posthumous, quoted by Stephen Spender The Struggle of the Modem (London:
Hamish Hamilton) 1963, p. 39.

Elias's 1968 "Postscript"

in The Civilizing Process.
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